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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals, 
which has appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's judgment under 
Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the district court err in concluding that Utah law does not 
require an agency to transcribe any audio recordings that are part of the 
administrative rule-making record? 
Statutory interpretation is a legal question reviewed for correctness. 
Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, ,I 12, 267 P.3d 863. 
The issue was preserved below. R. 383-86, 732-34. 
2. Is the district court's final judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' claims 
inconsistent with prior rulings in this case (and does that matter)? 
Interpreting court orders is a legal question reviewed for correctness. 
Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P .2d 339, 346 (Utah 1996). The issue was 
preserved below. R. 1300-04, 1491-93. 
3. Does the challenged administrative rule go beyond the scope of 
the Massage Therapy Practice Act or violate the United States Constitution? 
The validity of an administrative rule presents a legal question 
reviewed for correctness. Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Dep't of Workforce 
Servs., 1999 UT App 222, ,I,I 8, 10, 984 P.2d 399. Plaintiffs arguably 
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preserved at least some of the arguments they make related to this issue. 
See, e.g., R. 255-72, 365-66. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code§ 58-47b-102(6): 
Relevant versions of this statute defining "practice of massage therapy" 
are quoted and discussed in the brief. 
Utah Admin. Code R.156-47b-102(10): 
"'Manipulation', as used in Subsection 58-47b-102(6)(b), means contact 
with movement, involving touching the clothed or unclothed body." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
This case originally arises from citations the Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing (DOPL) issued to the individual Plaintiffs Jeff 
Stucki and Leisa Metcalf for violating the Message Therapy Practice Act 
(Act). But the appeal now focuses on a challenge to an administrative rule-
promulgated after the citations were issued-that defines manipulation for 
purposes of the practice of massage therapy. Given the narrowed focus on 
appeal, relatively few facts need to be rehearsed to assist the Court in 
resolving the matter. 
Legal background 
DOPL enforces the Act. Utah Code§§ 58-47b-101 et seq. The Act 
requires a person to be licensed before she can charge or receive payment "for 
2 
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providing a service that is within the practice of massage therapy." Utah 
Code § 58-4 7b-301(2)(c). In 2011, when Plaintiffs were cited, the Act defined 
the "practice of massage therapy" in relevant part as: 
(b) the systematic manual or mechanical manipulation of the soft 
tissue of the body for the purpose of: 
(i) promoting the health and well-being of a client; 
(ii) enhancing the circulation of the blood and lymph; 
(iii) relaxing and lengthening muscles; 
(iv) relieving pain; 
(v) restoring metabolic balance; 
(vi) achieving homeostasis; and 
(vii) recreational or other purposes; 
(f) oil rubs, heat lamps, salt glows, hot and cold packs, or tub, 
shower, steam, and cabinet baths. 
Utah Code§ 58-47b-102(6) (Westlaw 2011). 
The Act exempts various other professionals (health care providers, 
athletic trainers, therapists, etc.) and gratuitous massages from the licensing 
requirement. Utah Code § 58-4 7b-304. More generally, the Utah Code 
allows licensees in an occupation lawfully to practice their profession without 
having to obtain licensure for other occupations. Utah Code § 58-1-307(3). 
DOPL, with input from the Board of Massage Therapy, has rulemaking 
authority. Utah Code §§ 58-1-202(1)(a), -203(1)(c); id§ 63G-3-201. In 2012, 
DOPL promulgated a rule (Rule) defining "manipulation" for purposes of the 
"practice of massage therapy" in subsection 58-47b-102(6)(b), as "contact with 
3 
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movement, involving touching the clothed or unclothed body." Utah Admin. 
Code R.156-47b-102(10). 1 
The DOPL citations 
DOPL received a complaint in August 2011 that Zen Healing Arts, 
LLC, dba Beaches Bodyworks, was giving massages without licensed 
massage therapists. Plaintiffs Exh. 1, Sept. 14, 2014 Exh. List. The 
complaint prompted an investigation. After investigating and discussing the 
situation with Plaintiffs, DOPL issued a cease and desist citation to Plaintiff 
Leisa Metcalf, a Zen Healing Arts, LLC, employee, for practicing massage 
therapy without a license. Plaintiffs Exh. 2-4, Sept. 14, 2014 Exh. List. 
DOPL also issued a cease and desist citation to Plaintiff Jeff Stucki, Zen 
Healing Art, LLC's owner, for hiring unlicensed massage therapists. 
Plaintiffs Exh. 2, Jan. 25, 2016 Exh. List. Both citations were issued in 
September 2011, before DOPL enacted the Rule. 
Administrative and judicial proceedings 
Plaintiffs challenged the citations administratively. An administrative 
hearing officer upheld the citations in October 2011, as did the Department of 
Commerce in March 2012. R. 138-49. The Department's ruling found the 
1 DOPL gives the current citation for the Rule. When first enacted, the Rule 
was located in R.156-47b-102(8). The Rule has not changed. 
4 
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citations were justified by the Act alone without reference to the Rule. R. 
146. 
Plaintiffs then sought judicial review of the Department's decision by 
filing a complaint in the district court. R. 1-13. Plaintiffs later amended the 
complaint to include a challenge to the Rule. R. 122-152. After receiving 
testimony from various witnesses at trial, and based on the applicable law, 
the district court upheld the individual Plaintiffs' citations for violating the 
Act's licensing requirements. R. 1272-89. The court found ample evidence 
proving that Ms. Metcalf had practiced massage therapy without a license 
and that Mr. Stucki had hired persons practicing massage therapy without a 
license. R. 1277-86. 
Turning to the Rule, the district court first determined Plaintiffs had 
standing to challenge the Rule even though it was enacted after they received 
their citations. R. 1289-90, ilil 64-66. On the merits, the court concluded that 
the Rule was valid: the definition of manipulation merely clarified the Act 
rather than enlarging it. R. 1292, ilil 72-73. The Court reviewed the 
evidence supporting the Rule and rejected Plaintiffs' arguments that the Rule 
swept too broadly and would be used to regulate sexually oriented businesses 
or innocuous, incidental human touching. R. 1293-94, ilil 75-80. The Court 
emphasized that the Act limited massage therapy to the payment for 
5 
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systematic manipulation of soft tissue for a statutorily enumerated purpose. 
R. 1294, ilil 81-82. 
The district court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
November 13, 2015. R. 1270. Plaintiffs filed several post-trial motions, 
which the court denied on February 18, 2016. R. 1489-1500. The district 
court entered final judgment that same day. R. 1501. Plaintiffs timely 
appealed. R. 1503-04. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs fail to show that the district court erred in upholding the 
Rule and dismissing their claims. First, Plaintiffs seemingly argue that the 
Rule is not supported by substantial evidence as a matter of law. Their 
argument hinges on the notion that DOPL had the burden to prove 
substantial evidence existed but failed to do so because DOPL did not 
transcribe several audio recordings that were part of the administrative 
record, all of which prevented the district court from reviewing the entire 
record. This argument is wrong in every respect. 
Plaintiffs, not DOPL, bear the burden of proof on a substantial evidence 
challenge. They must marshal all of the facts in support of the Rule and 
show the Rule still lacks substantial evidence. The applicable law required 
DOPL only to produce the Rule's administrative record, which includes audio 
recordings. DOPL did this. Nothing demands that DOPL then transcribe 
6 
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audio recordings for Plaintiffs' use. Likewise, the district court need only 
review the relevant findings to determine if they are reasonable and rational. 
It has no duty to, and cannot, independently assess and reweigh the evidence 
from the entire record. Plaintiffs cannot foist its burdens onto DOPL and the 
district court in hopes of winning a substantial evidence challenge by default. 
Here, the district court highlighted the substantial evidence supporting 
the Rule. Plaintiffs do not marshal the evidence, nor show that the 
supporting evidence is not substantial. Their substantial evidence challenge 
should be rejected on the law and the facts. 
Second, Plaintiffs argue the district court's final judgment dismissing 
their claims is inconsistent with prior partial summary judgment orders 
and/or the court's determination about the conduct to which the Act applies. 
This argument also lacks merit. As an initial matter, no district court is 
bound by its prior orders. Plaintiffs' inconsistency arguments, even if 
factually accurate, are legally irrelevant. 
Moreover, the final judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' claims is wholly 
consistent with the court's prior rulings or findings. In relevant part, 
Plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the Rule was invalid. The 
court interpreted the prior orders on partial summary judgment to mean that 
the Rule could not allow DOPL to expand the scope of the Act. The court 
subsequently found that the Rule did not do so, and that the Act-regardless 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the Rule-prohibited the Plaintiffs' cited conduct. The court also outlined 
the type of conduct to which the licensing requirements for the practice of 
massage therapy applied-receiving payment for systematic manipulation of 
soft tissue for a statutorily enumerated purpose. That's the conduct for 
which Plaintiffs' were cited. Dismissing Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory 
relief is consistent with these rulings. The final judgment does not negate 
the court's determinations. Rather those determinations lead directly to the 
final judgment. Plaintiffs are not entitled to some other declaratory 
judgment relief. 
Finally, Plaintiffs allege various reasons the Rule is invalid: it's 
arbitrary and capricious, beyond the Act's scope, unconstitutionally vague or 
overbroad. But for the most part, Plaintiffs do not adequately brief these 
arguments. The Court could reject them for this reason alone. Even 
addressing the merits, however, Plaintiffs fail to show the Rule is invalid. 
The Rule fits well within the scope of the Act. The Rule defines 
manipulation as "contact with movement, involving touching the clothed or 
unclothed body." That definition is consistent with the plain meaning of the 
term and with massage therapy practices, which recognize light touch 
massage as an accepted modality called effleurage. It is also consistent with 
the Act's provisions outlining the practice of message therapy for various 
8 
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purposes. Nothing in the Act suggests the Rule's definition of manipulation 
goes too far. 
The Rule is not arbitrary or capricious, to the extent that's even a valid 
argument in this context. The district court found that the Rule was 
intended to "broadly define massage therapy to reflect the generally accepted 
notions of massage therapy," including effleurage, and to exclude Reiki, 
which involves touching but no movement. The Rule was further intended to 
protect the integrity of the massage industry and to distinguish that industry 
from sexually oriented businesses. Plaintiffs have not contradicted these 
findings. These purposes are reasonable and rationally related to the express 
language and purposes of the Act, and the legislature's purposes in 
regulating the massage therapy industry. 
The Rule is not overbroad under the First Amendment. As an initial 
matter, it seems doubtful that massages invoke First Amendment 
protections. The overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech. 
Regardless, the Rule satisfies any potentially applicable test. It satisfies the 
O'Brien overbreadth test, when "speech and nonspeech elements are 
combined in the same course of conduct," because the Rule (1) is within the 
constitutional power of the State; (2) it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and ( 4) the incidental restriction on alleged 
9 
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First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance 
of that interest. The Rule also satisfies the more general overbreadth test 
because it (1) does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected conduct, and (2) the statute is not readily subject to a narrowing 
construction. 
The Rule is not unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiffs lack standing to 
make this argument because their conduct was clearly proscribed by the Act 
(indeed, Plaintiffs no longer challenge their citations). Regardless, the Rule 
is not vague because it gives appropriate notice to those who must be licensed 
and it does not encourage arbitrary enforcement. 
For all of these reasons, the district court's judgment should be 
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
The district court properly upheld the Plaintiffs' administrative 
citations and the validity of the Rule. On appeal, the Plaintiffs no longer 
appear to challenge their citations. Instead, their arguments largely focus on 
challenging the Rule.2 None of Plaintiffs' arguments undermines the district 
court's decisions. 
2 The district court held that Plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Rule 
even though it was promulgated after, and played no role in, their 
administrative citations. R. 1289-90, ,I,I 64-66. Only persons "aggrieved" by 
a rule may seek judicial review thereof. Utah Code § 63G-3-602(1)(a). To be 
10 
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I. Plaintiffs Failed To Prove The Rule Is Not Supported By 
Substantial Evidence Based on DOPL's Production of 
Audio Recordings as Part of the Administrative Record. 
Plaintiffs first argue that the Rule is not supported by substantial 
evidence. But it is more of a legal argument than evidentiary. They claim 
DOPL failed its burden to prove the Rule was supported by substantial 
evidence because DOPL never produced a written transcript of the audio 
recordings from the administrative record under Utah Code§ 63G-3-602(3) 
thereby preventing the district court from fulfilling its obligation to review 
the entire record under subsection 602(4). See Aplt. Br. at 28-29. The 
conclusion and each premise of this argument are wrong. 
As an initial matter, subsection 602( 4) doesn't support Plaintiffs' 
argument. The section says merely that the district court "may" declare a 
rule void if the court finds "the rule is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole administrative record." Utah Code§ 63G-
3-602(4)(a)(ii). This provision does not allow (much less compel) the district 
court to independently review and reweigh the entire record. "[I]n 
"aggrieved" means that Plaintiffs must show they have "suffered some 
distinct and palpable injury that gives [them] a personal stake in the outcome 
of the legal dispute." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Property Tax Div. of Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 979 P.2d 346, 351 (Utah 1999). DOPL doubts whether the Rule 
has caused or will cause the Plaintiffs any distinct or palpable injury 
considering they were cited before the Rule was enacted and Zen Healing 
Arts is not currently operating. In other words, it remains unclear what 
services Plaintiffs believe they could legally provide before the Rule was 
enacted that the Rule now prohibits. 
11 
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determining whether a rule is supported by substantial evidence, courts must 
decide if the relevant findings were reasonable and rational, although such 
an assessment does not constitute a de nova review or a reweighing of the 
evidence." Associated Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil, Gas and Mining, 2001 
UT 112, 1 21, 38 P.3d 291 (internal quotation marks omitted). And, per the 
section's plain language, only a finding of no substantial evidence must be 
made in light of the whole record. The district court was able to find 
substantial evidence with the record presented to it. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' arguments, the party challenging a rule on 
substantial evidence grounds "must marshal all of the evidence supporting 
the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the ... findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence." Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). In short, Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the Rule lacked 
substantial evidence in light of the entire record. Neither DOPL nor the 
district court had any duty to do Plaintiffs' job. 
Similarly, DOPL had no duty to create written transcripts of relevant 
audio recordings. To be sure, DOPL must "file the administrative record of 
the rule, if any, with its" pleading responding to Plaintiffs' rule challenge. 
Utah Code § 63G-3-602(3)(b)(iii). But that doesn't require DOPL to create 
and file transcripts of any Rule-related audio recordings. Indeed, the 
Rulemaking Act defines the "administrative record" as including "the public 
12 
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comment received and recorded by the agency." Id.§ 63G-3-102(1)(b) 
(emphasis added). The statute expressly contemplates that recordings may 
be part of the administrative record provided by the agency. Plaintiffs 
acknowledge that DOPL produced the relevant audio recordings. Aplt. Br. at 
25. The statutes require nothing more. R. 732-34. 
In analogous circumstances, the rules of appellate procedure put the 
burden on the appellant to include the transcript in the record when 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Utah R. App. P. ll(e)(2). The 
rules emphasize that "[n]either the court nor the appellee is obligated to 
correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the 
transcript." Id. So too here. If Plaintiffs wanted to use the audio recordings 
as part of their substantial evidence argument, it was Plaintiffs' duty to 
transcribe the recordings and point the district court to any parts of the 
transcript Plaintiffs believed supported their argument. 
The Court should reject Plaintiffs' attempt to reverse the burdens of 
proof and prevail by default on substantial evidence grounds. The argument 
lacks any legal basis. 
And it's also clear that Plaintiffs could not prevail on a more traditional 
fact-based substantial evidence challenge. Here, both the district court's 
opinion and the Plaintiffs' brief highlight substantial evidence supporting the 
Rule. R. 1273, ,r,r 3-4; id. 1291, ,r 69; Aplt. Br. at 26-27. Plaintiffs-not 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DOPL or the district court-had the burden to marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the Rule and prove it still lacks substantial evidence. Associated 
Gen. Contractors, 2001 UT 112, ,r,r 21, 32. The Plaintiffs failed to do so below 
or on appeal. 3 They do not marshal all of the supporting facts, much less 
show how DOPL's or the district court's findings lack substantial evidence. 
See id. ,I'jf 33-34. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' substantial evidence argument 
must be rejected. Id. 'if 32 ("If a party fail[s] to satisfy [its] burden of 
marshaling the evidence and showing that the [agency]'s finding[s][are] not 
supported by substantial evidence, we [will] affirm the [agency]'s findings." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
II. The District Court's Judgment Is Not Inconsistent, and 
Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Any Relief. 
Plaintiffs appear to argue that the district court's final judgment 
dismissing Plaintiffs' claims contradicts certain prior rulings from the court. 
Aplt. Br. at 41-42. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert the final judgment rejects 
prior partial summary judgment rulings about the Rule's scope and findings 
about what constitutes the practice of massage therapy. Id. at 39-42. 
Plaintiffs insist they are entitled to a declaratory judgment endorsing those 
rulings. Id. at 42. These arguments lack merit. 
3 Plaintiffs mention a motion to strike some expert testimony. Aplt. Br. at 27-
28. But they haven't raised the presumed denial of that motion as an issue 
on appeal, nor have they substantively argued the point in their brief. Id. 
The argument is therefore waived. 
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First, the premise of Plaintiffs' argument-that the district court is 
bound by its prior interlocutory orders-is wrong. The rules of civil 
procedure expressly state that interlocutory orders "may be changed at any 
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights 
and liabilities of all the parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). "As long as the case 
has not been appealed and remanded, reconsideration of an issue before a 
final judgment is within the sound discretion of the district court." IHC 
Health Serus., Inc. u. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ~ 27, 196 P.3d 588. 
Thus, final judgments do not have to be consistent with prior non-final 
rulings. And arguing inconsistency on that ground, as Plaintiffs do, is legally 
irrelevant and does not warrant reversal. 
Second, even if it mattered, the final judgment is consistent with the 
court's prior rulings. As Plaintiffs (and the district court) explained, the court 
entered an order granting partial summary judgment that it later clarified. 
Aplt. Br. at 32-34; R. 741-45, 971-72, 1292, 1492-93. In relevant part, the 
orders as amended determined that the Rule's definition of manipulation did 
not run afoul of the Massage Therapy Practice Act and that DOPL "may, 
within the scope of the Act, define the range of activities that a therapist is 
allowed to do or is prohibited from doing." R. 7 44, 972, 1493. The orders also 
stated, "the Division may not define the scope of activities, including 
manipulation, of individuals that are not licensed massage therapists or 
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holding themselves out, by word or act, as massage therapists." R. 972, 1493. 
The court later explained that these orders simply meant that "a rule may 
not empower DOPL to regulate people or conduct that the legislature has not 
permitted," R. 1292, ,r 72, and that the Rule "could not be interpreted in a 
manner which would expand the scope of the" Act. R. 1493. 
Both the district court's Findings and Conclusions and its Post-Trial 
Order held that the Rule did not expand the Act; the Rule clarified the Act by 
emphasizing that it may properly be applied to persons "offering light touch 
massage services for a fee." R. 1293; see also id. 1292, ,r 73. These 
conclusions are entirely consistent with the partial summary judgment 
orders and lead inexorably to the court's final judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' 
declaratory judgment challenging the Rule. 
Likewise, the court's ruling outlining the elements of massage therapy 
requiring a license does not contradict the final judgment or require 
affirmative relief. Consistent with the Act, the court explained that the 
practice of message therapy requires (1) payment for (2) systematic (3) 
manipulation of soft tissue (4) for one of the purposes identified in the Act. R. 
1294, 1 82. Plaintiffs appear to argue that the final judgment dismissing 
their claims negates or otherwise reduces to dicta the district court's findings 
about the elements of message therapy. Aplt. Br. at 40-42. But that is not 
true. 
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The judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' claims does not undermine the 
court's findings and conclusions supporting the judgment. Those 
determinations apply to the parties unless altered on appeal or by amending 
the statute. The judgment of dismissal merely reflects the fact that Plaintiffs 
failed to show any available grounds for declaratory relief under the 
applicable statute. 
By law, the district court may "grant relief to" someone challenging a 
rule by "declaring the rule invalid, if the court finds" that: (1) "the rule 
violates constitutional or statutory law or the agency does not have legal 
authority to make the rule"; (2) "the rule is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole administrative record"; or (3) "the 
agency did not follow proper rulemaking procedure." Utah Code § 63G-3-
602( 4)(a).4 Plaintiffs' amended complaint requested, in relevant part, 
"declaratory relief specifically finding that the Rule [is] arbitrary, capricious, 
discriminatory and burdensome and ... unconstitutional." R. 131, ,I 25. For 
the reasons explained more fully below, the district court did not find that the 
Rule was unconstitutional or otherwise invalid. The court therefore had no 
other choice under the governing statute but to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim 
requesting a declaratory judgment that the Rule was invalid. 
4 Section 602(4) authorizes other forms of relief but they are not relevant here 
because Plaintiffs argue only that the district court should have granted 
them some type of declaratory judgment. Aplt. Br. at 42. 
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Plaintiffs invoke the more general Declaratory Judgment Act to argue 
that they are still entitled to a judgment declaring their rights and 
responsibilities. Aplt. Br. at 42. Even assuming that statute applies, 5 it does 
not compel the district court to issue a declaratory judgment here. Rather, 
the Declaratory Judgment Act says a "district court has the power to issue 
declaratory judgments determining rights, status, and other legal relations." 
Utah Code § 78B-6-401(1). But the power to issue a declaratory judgment 
does not compel that the power be used whenever requested.6 That's 
especially true here because the Plaintiffs' did not prove their entitlement to 
their requested relief-a declaration that the Rule was unconstitutional or 
otherwise invalid. Indeed, the district court rejected that argument in its 
conclusions of law: "The Rule promulgated by DOPL defining 'manipulation' 
... is a valid exercise of DOPL's rulemaking authority and is upheld." R. 
1296. In effect, Plaintiffs got a declaration of their rights vis-a-vis the Rule, 
5 The Administrative Rulemaking Act, and section 63G-3-602(4) in particular, 
is the more specific provision governing declaratory relief in the context of 
administrative rule challenges. It therefore applies here and prevails over 
the more general Declaratory Judgment Act. See, e.g., Williams v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm 'n, 754 P .2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988). 
6 For example, the statute expressly states that the court may refuse to enter 
declaratory relief if a judgment would not terminate the parties' dispute. Id. 
§ 78B .. 6-404; see also Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 
P .2d 870, 882 (Utah 1996) ("The statute gives a trial court discretion to either 
grant or deny a party's declaratory judgment action by virtue of the statute's 
use of the word 'may."'). 
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they just don't like it. But that doesn't mean they are entitled to a more 
palatable judgment. 
In sum, the final judgment is not inconsistent with prior interlocutory 
orders and the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a declaratory judgment. 
III. The Rule Is Valid And Plaintiffs Have Not Shown Otherwise. 
Plaintiffs' next argument section alleges the Rule is invalid for various 
reasons: it's arbitrary and capricious, beyond the Act's scope, or violates the 
First Amendment as overbroad or unconstitutionally vague. (Plaintiffs do 
not appear to challenge DOPL's authority to make, or procedures in adopting, 
the Rule). Although Plaintiffs' arguments encompass fifteen pages, they are 
not clearly defined or briefed. Plaintiffs do not cite to any authorities on 
rulemaking or their burdens to challenge successfully a rule. They do not 
articulate whether they bring an as-applied or a facial constitutional 
challenge. 
Moreover, throughout their argument, Plaintiffs misstate their burden. 
They assert, without citation to authority, that it is the State's burden to 
show that the Rule was not arbitrary or capricious and that it is 
constitutional. But the opposite is true. As the parties challenging the Rule, 
Plaintiffs had the burden to show that the Rule is arbitrary, capricious, 
outside statutory authority, or unconstitutional. State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 
4, il 8, 84 P.3d 1171 ("[T]hose who challenge a statute ... as unconstitutional 
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bear a heavy burden demonstrating its unconstitutionality." (internal 
quotations omitted)); Associated Gen. Contractors, 2001 UT 112, ,I 21 
(challenging party has duty to marshal the evidence and show the rule is not 
supported by substantial evidence). 
Plaintiffs have not meaningfully briefed all of their arguments 
challenging the Rule's validity and the Court could affirm the district court 
for that reason alone. But to the extent any of the validity arguments are 
adequately briefed, they still fail as discussed below. Plaintiffs have not 
satisfied their burden of proof and persuasion. 
A. The Rule conforms to the Act. 
Plaintiffs fail their burden to show the Rule is outside the scope of the 
Massage Therapy Practice Act (the "Act"). Agency rules must be consistent 
with the agency's governing statutes. Crossroads Plaza Ass'n v. Pratt, 912 
P.2d 961, 965 (Utah 1996). Courts grant agency rules a presumption of 
validity in determining whether they are consistent with their governing 
statutes. Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 1999 UT App 
222, ,I 12, 984 P .2d 399. Moreover, "[r]ules made in the exercise of a power 
delegated by statute should be construed together with the statute to make, if 
possible, an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and 
sound reason." Crossroads Plaza, 912 P.2d at 965. 
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When a rule is challenged on the grounds that it violates a statute, 
courts apply its existing standards of review in the absences of a legislative 
pronouncement to the contrary. The agency's conclusions of law are reviewed 
for correctness. Associated General Contractors, 2001 UT 112, il 18. Agency 
conclusions regarding mixed findings of fact and law or ultimate facts are 
given great deference and will not be set aside unless they are not rationally 
based or are "imposed arbitrarily and caprici9usly or are beyond the tolerable 
limits of reason." Id. (quoting Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41, 
50 (Utah 1988)). 
The arbitrary and capricious standard also applies when the agency "is 
otherwise in a better position than the courts to assess the law due to its 
experience with the relevant subject matter." Id. il 18. For example, in 
Associated General Contractors, the Utah Supreme Court deferred to the 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining's definitions of terms like "sand, gravel, and 
rock aggregate." Id. ,I 19. The terms, which were not defined in the statute, 
"were scientific and technical in nature" and concerned a subject matter that 
"courts address only occasionally but that the Board and the Division 
handled regularly." Id. The court recognized that this expertise and 
authority placed the "Board in a better position than the judiciary" to 
interpret and define industry-specific terms. The court therefore determined 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the appropriate standard of review was whether the adopted definitions were 
arbitrary or capricious. 7 Id. 
Here, DOPL has statutory authority to promulgate rules that 
effectuate the regulation of massage therapy. Utah Code§§ 58-47b-201, 58-1-
202, 13-1-6. Pursuant to that authority and in reliance on its expertise in the 
field of massage therapy, DOPL defined the term "manipulation," as used in 
section 58-4 7-102(6)(b) of the Act, as "contact with movement, involving 
touching the clothed or unclothed body." Utah Admin. Code R.156-4 7b-
102(10). That definition includes light touch massage. The district court 
found that this definition was consistent with the practice of massage 
therapy because light touch massage is a "recognized modality of massage 
called 'effleurage."' R. 1281, 1292. It is also consistent with the plain 
meaning of manipulation, which is to treat or operate with or as if with the 
hands ... especially in a skillful manner." Merriam-Webster, "manipulate", 
7 The Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Ellis-Hall Consultants v. 
Public Service Comm 'n, 2016 UT 1270, 379 P .3d 1270 does not alter this 
standard. There, the Court held that it would interpret agency regulations as 
a matter of law without affording any deference to the agency's interpretation 
of its own rules. Id. ,I 31-32. But that holding applied to the agency's 
interpretation of its previously adopted rules when it was applying them to 
the adjudication of a dispute between parties. Id. The Court did not address 
the agency's authority to determine the best definition of technical terms 
during the rulemaking process. Those decisions remain, and should remain, 
subject to deference as the relevant agency is in the best position to 
determine the appropriate meaning of technical terms during its rulemaking 
process. 
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available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/manipulation (last 
visited 12/14/16). Plaintiffs have not cited anything to contradict this 
definition or the district court's findings. In fact, its own expert agreed that 
light touching could constitute massage. R. 1281. 
DOPL's definition should be given deference as it has the expertise and 
is in the best position to determine what types of manipulation fall within the 
scope of massage therapy as it is practiced and taught. But under any 
standard of review, the district court correctly held that DOPL's Rule merely 
clarified the Act because the Act already included not only deep pressure 
massages, but also medium pressure massages and light touch massages. R. 
1282. 
The language of the Act supports DOPL's and the district court's 
interpretation. The subsection at issue defines "massage therapy" as: 
(b) the systematic manual or mechanical manipulation of the soft tissue 
of the body" for the purpose of: 
(i) promoting the therapeutic health or well-being of a client; 
(ii) enhancing the circulation of the blood and lymph; 
(iii) relaxing and lengthening muscles; 
(iv) relieving pain 
(v) restoring metabolic balance; 
(vi) aGhieving homeostasis; or 
(vii) other purposes. 
Utah Code 58-47b-102(6)(b) (West 2012). Moreover, the Act defines "soft 
tissue" as "the muscle and related connective tissue." The district court found 
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that in the massage therapy profession that includes skin. R. 1283. 
Plaintiffs' own expert's testimony supported this finding, and Plaintiffs do not 
dispute it. 
Nothing in this definition's language suggests that the legislature 
intended to exclude light touch massage, require the application of a 
particular amount of pressure, or limit massage therapy to one particular 
method of massage. And the expansive list of purposes, including the phrase 
"other purposes," indicates the legislature intended to include manipulation 
for more purposes than just those that can be achieved through the 
application of medium to deep pressure. 
Further, the definition at issue is only one of the meanings of massage 
therapy in the Act. The remaining definitions further indicate the legislature 
did not intend to regulate only a particular type of massage but rather meant 
to include a number of practices within the scope of the Act. In addition to 
the definition cited above, "massage therapy" includes evaluating the soft 
tissues to promote homeostasis, using rehabilitative procedures on the soft 
tissues, performing oil rubs, using heat lamps and salt glows, performing 
manual traction and stretching exercises, and counseling and services to 
reduce incidents of movement dysfunction and pain. It additionally includes 
"similar or related activities and modality techniques," id. § 58-4 7b-102(6)(j), 
and providing, offering, or advertising "a paid service using the term massage 
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or a derivative of the word massage." Id.§ 58-47b-102(6)(1). These 
subsections further indicate a light touch massage falls within the scope of 
the Act, even without the definition of "manipulation" in the Rule. 
Plaintiffs argue that legislative history supports its argument that the 
definition in the Rule is outside the scope of the Act because the legislature 
intended to include only massage for "therapeutic purposes." Plaintiffs do not 
explain how the term "therapeutic" excludes light touch massages. But, 
regardless, the legislative history does not support Plaintiffs' position. 
Prior to 2011, the Act required manipulation to be for the "therapeutic 
purpose" of one of the specifically enumerated items in the statute. See H.B. 
243 Enrolled Copy, Aplt. Br. Addendum D, at R. 276. In 2011, the legislature 
amended that Act to remove that term. Id. At the same time, it inserted the 
category "recreational or other purposes" as one of the enumerated purposes 
under section 58-47b-102(6)(b). Id. While the term "therapeutic" has since 
been reinserted, it is not in the same location it once occupied. Aplt. Br. 
Addendum D, at R. 287. It no longer prefaces (and qualifies) the list of 
statutory purposes, but instead appears only in one enumerated purpose, 
Utah Code§ 58-47b-102(6)(b)(i). This indicates that massage must be 
therapeutic only if used for the purpose of promoting the "health and well-
being of a client" and not for the other purposes on the list. Id. Moreover, in 
that same session, the legislature elected to retain the term "other purposes." 
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Id. 58-47b-102(6)(b)(vii). It also added another definition to the term 
"practice of massage therapy," which states that providing, offering, or 
advertising "a paid service using the term massage or a derivative of the 
word massage" fell within the scope of conduct regulated by the Act. Id. § 58-
47b-102(6)(1). Both changes suggest that the legislature did not intend to 
limit the Act to therapeutic massage. 
Plaintiffs also assert the legislature rejected the Rule because an early 
draft of the bill with the 2012 amendments included DOPL's definition, but it 
was removed before the bill passed. Plaintiffs cite no evidence that this 
language was rejected because the legislature disagreed with DOPL's 
definition. While an earlier version of the bill included a definition of 
"manipulation," that language was removed while the bill was still in 
committee. It was not removed because of a disagreement with the definition 
or the inclusion of light touch massage, but under pressure from 
chiropractors who did not like other professions using that term. H.B. 114, 
House Business and Labor Committee, Feb. 6, 2012, at 1:44 (Rep. T. 
Cosgrove), available at http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/ 
MediaPlayer.php?view_id=25&clip_id=618. Before the motion passed to 
remove the language, the Director of DOPL testified that DOPL already had 
its own rule defining manipulation the same way as had been proposed. Id. 
at 1:53 (M. Steinagel). Neither the committee nor the legislature expressed 
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concern with this meaning or DOPL's interpretation or enforcement of the 
Act. 
The history of the Act indicates that the legislature wanted to cast a 
broad net to prevent businesses from performing massage and competing 
with massage therapists without first becoming licensed. It also wanted to 
distinguish legitimate massage practitioners from persons using massage as 
a front for illegal commercial sexual activity. Id.; see also H.B. 114, Senate 
Business and Labor Committee, Feb. 14, 2012, at 15:01, available at 
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=879&meta_id=3 
3643; HB 114, Massage Therapy Amendments, 2012 General Legislative 
Session, House Day 19 at 5:17 (R. T. Cosgrove) (bill meant to prevent 
unlicensed businesses from using loopholes to compete with properly licensed 
practitioners), available at http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/ 
MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=759&meta_id=30107; HB 114, Massage Therapy 
Amendments, 2012 General Legislative Session, Senate Day 29, at 23:50 (S. 
A. Osmond) (bill meant to protect massage therapy profession and to prevent 
individuals from opening a business that looked like a massage-type business 
(but was not licensed) as a front for prostitution or illegal activities), 
available at http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/ MediaPlayer.php? 
clip_id=1044&meta_id=39070. 
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Plaintiffs have not cited any evidence that the legislature rejected 
DOPL's definition of manipulation or its interpretation of the Act. If the 
legislature or committee determined DOPL's definition was beyond the scope 
of the Act, it could have passed language clarifying that massage therapy 
excluded light touch massage or otherwise required more than systematic 
touch with movement for an enumerated purpose. The fact it did not do so 
supports the district court's determination that DOPL's definition merely 
clarified the Act and is not beyond the scope of DOPL's authority. 
B. The Rule is not arbitrary and capricious (or irrational). 
Plaintiffs suggest the Rule is arbitrary or capricious. Aplt. Br. at 42. 
But that is not an expressly recognized ground for declaring the Rule invalid. 
Utah Code§ 63G-3-602(4)(a). DOPL assumes Plaintiffs allege the Rule is 
irrational for constitutional purposes. Aplt. Br. at 55. 
Whatever Plaintiffs precise theory is, they cannot show that the Rule is 
irrational (or arbitrary and capricious). The district court found that the 
Rule was intended to "broadly define massage therapy to reflect the generally 
accepted notions of massage therapy," including effleurage, and to exclude 
Reiki, which involves touching but no movement. R. 1291. The Rule was 
further intended to protect the integrity of the massage industry and to 
distinguish that industry from sexually oriented businesses. R. 1293. 
Plaintiffs have not contradicted these findings. These purposes are 
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reasonable and rationally related to the express language and purposes of the 
Act, and the legislature's purposes in regulating the massage therapy 
industry. See supra discussion of legislative history; see also H.B. 243, 2011 
Gen. Leg. Sess., House Floor Video Day 19, at 36:20 (Rep. Marley), available 
at http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/ MediaPlayer.php? 
clip_id=l 7384&meta_id=513259; id. at Day 30 (Rep. Marley), at 22:30, 
available at http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/ MediaPlayer.php?clip 
_id=l 7 415&meta_id=513967. 
Plaintiffs rely on Clayton v. Steinagel, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Utah) 
and Cornwell v. Hamilton, BO F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Calif. 1999) to assert the 
Rule requires unnecessary training and is therefore arbitrary. But Plaintiffs 
are not in the same position as the practitioners of African hair braiding in 
those cases. Both Clayton and Cornwell asserted equal protection claims, 
which have not been raised or briefed by Plaintiffs. Moreover, those cases 
found cosmetology licensing requirements for African hair braiding to be 
irrational because the hair braiders did not use heat, coloring, chemical 
treatments, or cutting, or other tools or methods general employed by 
cosmetologists, and the cosmetology curriculum and test covered little, if 
anything, related to African hair braiding. In contrast, light touch massage, 
or effleurage, is a recognized modality of massage therapy taught in massage 
therapy schools. R. 1292, 402-403. The relationship and balance of power 
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between the practitioner and client are similar R. 402. The difference 
between light touch massage and medium or deep massage, which Plaintiffs 
admit are included within the scope of the Act, is a matter of the degree. 
Light touch massage is not something that can be easily carved out and 
distinguished from a general massage therapy practice in the way that hair 
braiding can from a cosmetology practice. And, regardless of the amount of 
pressure, the State has the same interest to require licensing to protect the 
integrity of the massage therapy profession and prevent it from becoming 
associated with prohibited commercial sexual activity. R. 1293. Plaintiffs 
may disagree with the legislature's or DOPL's policies, but they cannot show 
the Rule is irrational. 
The district court correctly found that the Rule has a reasonable and 
rational relationship to the Act. R. 1294. This Court should affirm the 
district court's holding that it was a valid exercise of DOPL's rulemaking 
authority. R. 1296. 
C. The Rule does not violate the First Amendment and is 
not overbroad. 
Plaintiffs suggest the Rule "sweeps within its ambit much 
constitutionally protected conduct or speech." Aplt. Br. at 42. While non-
verbal, expressive conduct has been accorded First Amendment protection, 
not all conduct qualifies as protected expression. Mini Spas, Inc. v. South 
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1-.J 
Salt Lake City Corp., 810 F.2d 939, 941 (10th Cir. 1987). Here, Plaintiffs 
admit that massage is not speech under the First Amendment. Aplt. Br. at 
42. Even if it were, Plaintiffs' challenge fails because the Rule passes the 
applicable test and is not overbroad. 
I. The rule survives intermediate scrutiny under 
United States v. O'Brien. 
There is a four-part test for determining the validity of content-neutral 
limitations on First Amendment freedoms when '"speech and nonspeech 
elements are combined in the same course of conduct."' Mini Spas, 810 F.2d 
at 941 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)). A 
regulation is valid 
(1) if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; (2) 
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; 
(3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression; and ( 4) if the incidental restriction on alleged 
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
Plaintiffs do not even attempt to address this standard in their brief. 
Even if they did, the Rule easily passes scrutiny under the O'Brien test. 
First, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the state has the authority to impose 
licensing requirements or regulate the practice of professions. In re Primus, 
436 U.S. 412, 422 (1978). Here, it has delegated that authority to the Board 
of Massage Therapy and DOPL through the Act. Utah Code§ 58-47b-201. 
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The state also has the authority to regulate prostitution and prevent 
businesses from being used as a cover for that purpose. Mini-Spas, 810 F.2d 
at 941. 
Second, the Rule furthers important and substantial government 
interests. The state's interests in protecting massage therapy as a profession 
and in suppressing illegal sexual conduct are substantial and important. 
Mini-Spas, 810 F.2d at 941. The Rule furthers those interests by requiring 
those who wish to engage in massage therapy, even if it is light touch, to have 
a license. 
Third, the Rule is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. By 
its terms, the Rule only regulates conduct. It requires persons who engage in 
manipulation and meet the other requirements under the Act to first obtain a 
license, provided they also meet the other requirements under the Act. And 
it bans all unlicensed massage-not just unlicensed massage at particular 
establishments. The Rule is not aimed at suppressing or punishing any 
message conveyed through massage, but rather at protecting the massage 
therapy profession from unlicensed competition and from being affiliated 
with illegal commercial sexual activity. This is unrelated to the suppression 
of protected expression. See Mini-Spas, 810 F.2d at 941 (holding that 
suppressing prostitution is unrelated to inhibiting freedom of expression). 
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Fourth, the Rule is drawn so that any restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to further the State's 
interests. This element does not require that the State choose the least 
restrictive means available to further its interest. Instead, it requires only 
that the substantial government interest "would be achieved less effectively 
absent the regulation." Bushco v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 2009 UT 153, ,I 39, 
225 P.3d 153. Here, the state's interests in protecting the massage therapy 
profession from unlicensed competition and from being used as a front for 
illegal commercial sexual activity is more effectively achieved with the Rule 
than without it. And, the Rule's potential impact on the right of private 
citizens to engage in touching is de minimus. Read in harmony with the Act, 
the Rule cannot reasonably be construed to encompass incidental or 
innocuous touching or expression by those outside of the scope of the Act, 
such as waitresses or romantic partners. 
The Rule satisfies the O'Brien test. The district court therefore did not 
err when it rejected Plaintiffs' challenge and upheld the Rule. 
2. The Rule is not overbroad. 
Plaintiffs also cannot show the Rule is overbroad under the First 
Amendment. A law is overbroad if (1) it "reaches a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct, even if the statute also has a legitimate 
application", and (2) the statute is not readily subject to a narrowing 
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construction. Provo City v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, 1 11, 86 P .2d 735 
(internal quotation omitted). "Invalidation for overbreadth is '"strong 
medicine"' that is not to be 'casually employed."' U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 
285, 293 (2008). "[W]here a statute regulates expressive conduct, the scope of 
the statute does not render it unconstitutional unless its overbreadth is not 
only 'real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly 
legitimate sweep."' State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, 1 6, 31 P.3d 547 (quoting 
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990)). 
Plaintiffs' overbreadth challenge fails. As an initial matter, the 
overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech and, as a result, 
parties cannot assert claims that a statute interferes with the commercial 
speech rights of others not before the court. Murphy v. Matheson, 7 42 F .2d 
564, 569 (10th Cir. 1984). Plaintiffs therefore cannot assert the Rule 
interferes with the commercial rights of other professionals or workers who 
may engage in some touching during their jobs. 
Moreover, the Rule does not reach a substantial amount of protected 
conduct. The fact that some unconstitutional or non-commercial applications 
of the law can be imagined is not sufficient to invalidate ~ statute on 
overbreadth grounds, particularly if no constitutional problems are raised in 
the vast majority of its applications. Williams, 553 U.S. at 303; Murphy, 742 
F.2d at 569. Here, the Rule applies to licensed massage therapists or to those 
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persons holding themselves out-by word or conduct-as massage 
practitioners who should be licensed. Plaintiffs' arguments that the Rule will 
instill fear of touching upon ordinary citizens ignore the Act. R. 1294, 1498. 
The arguments are also not supported by any evidence of the Rule being 
enforced in that manner. 
The Rule is also subject to a narrowing construction. Laws are 
presumed to be constitutional, and any doubts are resolved in favor of 
constitutionality. State v. Norris, 2007 UT 6, 1 10, 152 P.3d 293; see also 
Morrison, 2001 UT 73, 1 6, (holding courts have a "duty to construe a statute 
whenever possible so as to ... save it from constitutional conflicts or 
infirmities."). Courts avoid interpretations that would work "a result so 
absurd that the legislature could not have intended it." State v. Jeffries, 2009 
UT 57, 1 8, 217 P.3d 265. Plaintiffs' parade of horribles that the Act will 
inhibit romantic touching between partners or punish waitresses who may 
touch the arm of a restaurant patron is an absurd reading of the Rule that is 
not supported by the language of the Act and was not intended by DOPL or 
the legislature. It is unlikely that the Rule would ever be used to bring 
criminal or civil charges against waitresses, romantic partners, or other 
ordinary citizens not engaged in performing massages for hire. It is even 
more unlikely that a court would interpret the Rule that way. The Rule is 
not overbroad, and Plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge fails. 
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D. The Rule is not unconstitutionally vague. 
Plaintiffs have not shown the Rule is unconstitutionally vague. A law 
"is not unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently explicit to inform the 
ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited." Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ,I 13. To 
succeed on a vagueness challenge, Plaintiffs have the burden to demonstrate 
either that (1) the statute does not provide the kind of notice that enables 
ordinary people to understand what conduct is prohibited, or (2) that the 
statute encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. State v. 
MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ,I 8, 84 P.3d 1171. Plaintiffs have not met, and cannot 
meet, this burden. 
1. Plaintiffs lack standing to raise a vagueness 
challenge. 
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs lack standing to raise a vagueness 
challenge to the Rule because it is constitutional as applied to them. A 
person who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed by law "'cannot 
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. A 
court should therefore examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing 
other hypothetical applications of the law."' Greenwood v. City of North Salt 
Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982)). Here, Plaintiffs 
admit that massage is not speech. Aplt. Br. at 42. Moreover, as both the 
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district court and the Department of Commerce determined, Plaintiffs' 
business-giving light touch massages in exchange for payment-clearly falls 
within the scope of conduct that must be licensed under the Act, with or 
without the Rule. R. 1291. Plaintiffs are not in the position of an esthetician, 
trainer, waitress, or romantic partner. Significantly, Plaintiffs no longer 
challenge their citations, essentially conceding that their conduct violated the 
Act. Plaintiffs therefore cannot challenge the Rule as vague. 
2. Plaintiffs have not shown the Rule fails to give 
appropriate notice. 
Moreover, the Rule is not unconstitutionally vague; it gives appropriate 
notice regarding those who must be licensed. The Rule does not stand on its 
own, but defines "manipulation" only within the context of the Act. See Utah 
Admin. Code R.156-4 7b(10) (defining "'manipulation' as used in" the Act 
(emphasis added)). The Act, in turn, requires more than just touching with 
movement to trigger its licensing requirements. The following must also be 
shown: (a) payment for the services; (b) the manipulation must be systematic; 
(c) the manipulation must be to the soft tissues; and (d) the manipulation 
must be for one of the stated purposes of the Act. Utah Code§ 58-47b-
102(6)(b). 
The district court correctly held that that Rule applies to only those 
who hold themselves out, by word or act, as engaging in the practice of 
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massage therapy. R. 781, 971-972, 1294, 1498. It cannot reasonably be 
construed as applying to estheticians, athletic trainers, or other licensed 
professionals. While other professionals may engage in some touch in the 
scope of their work, they are specifically excluded from compliance with the 
Act provided they stay within the scope of their respective licenses and do not 
hold themselves out as licensed massage therapists. Utah Code §§ 58-1-
307(3) (providing an individual "licensed under a specific chapter of the 
[Occupations and Professions title] "may engage in the lawful, professional, 
and competent practice of that occupation or profession without additional 
licensing under other chapters of this title .... ); 58-47b-304 (West 2012 & 
Supp. 2016) (excluding specific professions, including athletic trainers, from 
licensing under the Act). Gratuitous massages are likewise specifically 
excluded. Utah Code § 58-4 7b-304(1)(1). 
Despite this limiting language, Plaintiffs assert that the Rule causes 
people to live in fear that every day touching will trigger the licensing 
requirements. This is nothing more than an attempt to "inject doubt as to 
the meaning of words where no doubt would be felt by the normal reader." 
Clearfield City v. Hoyer, 2008 UT App 226, ,I 8, 189 P.Sd 94. This is not 
enough to meet their burden. Id. 
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3. Plaintiffs have not shown the Rule encourages 
arbitrary enforcement. 
The district court likewise properly rejected Plaintiffs' arbitrary 
enforcement arguments. Laws must provide "minimal guidelines to govern 
law enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983). 
Economic regulations, like the Rule, are subject to less strict vagueness tests 
both because the subject matter is more narrow and because businesses "can 
be expected to consult relevant legislation" in advance of action. Village of 
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498-99, abrogated on other grounds by Johnson 
v. U.S., 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560-61 (2015). Likewise, the penalties in economic 
regulations are less severe. Id. at 499. 
The Rule gives DOPL and law enforcement sufficient guidance to 
prevent arbitrary enforcement. As recognized by the district court, the Rule 
did not expand DOPL's authority outside of the massage therapy profession. 
R. 1292. Rather, the Act makes it sufficiently clear that those who engage or 
hold themselves out as engaging in the systemic manipulation-light or 
otherwise-of the soft tissues for a fee must have a license. Utah Code § 58-
47b-102(6)(b). Gratuitous massages are specifically exempted, as is 
manipulation or massage provided by other licensed professionals in the 
scope of their duties. Utah Code 58-4 7b-304; id. § 58-1-307(3). While the Act 
gives some discretion to DOPL, it does not permit DOPL or law enforcement 
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to apply the Rule to any touching that occurs in either non-commercial or 
private settings. 
Plaintiffs spend much of their brief alleging, without evidence, that 
DOPL and its agents may employ the Rule to prosecute incidental touching 
and innocent acts. Aplt. Br. at 48-49. The district court rejected these 
arguments, holding the Rule does not prohibit innocuous or incidental 
touching, R. 1292-94, 1498-99, and there is no evidence that DOPL has ever 
sought to enforce it in this manner. R. 1293. The district court also found a 
lack of any evidence that DOPL or its investigator (Alison Pettley) have used 
the Rule to regulate sexually oriented businesses. R. 1293. To the contrary, 
the Act is meant to draw a line between massage therapy and those 
enterprises. R. 1293. 
Plaintiffs citation to State v. Kelso, a Second District Court criminal 
case involving parties not before this Court, does not contradict the district 
court's findings in this case. There, an undercover police officer hired a 
licensed esthetician to give him a "Nirvana massage" as part of a prostitution 
sting operation. The defendant did not engage in prostitution, but the 
district attorney charged her with the unlicensed practice of massage 
therapy. At the preliminary hearing, the district court refused to bind the 
defendant over for trial because the district attorney had not presented 
evidence that her actions exceeded the scope of her master esthetician 
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license, which permitted her to perform lymphatic massage, and therefore 
failed to support a reasonable belief that she had practiced massage therapy 
without a license. State v. Kelso, Second Judicial District, Davis County, 
State of Utah, Case No. 12170518 (J. D.M. Connors). 
Kelso does not show the enforcement of the Rule is arbitrary. It 
involves one very narrow overlap between the permissible duties of two 
different professional licenses-master estheticians and massage therapists. 
Any ambiguity between massage therapists and estheticians does not exist 
for most of the population. Moreover, the law expressly permits licensed 
master estheticians to engage in certain types of massage or touching with 
movement without being subject to the terms of the Act. See Utah Code §§ 
58-lla-102(34) (Supp. 2016) (including lymphatic massage within definition 
of "practice of master-level esthetics); 57-1-307(3) (permitting persons to 
practice full scope of their license without obtain licensing under other 
chapters). The fact that massage may be defined differently by other 
professions is irrelevant because the Act does not apply to them provided 
they stay within the scope of what their license permits. Likewise, one 
officer's failure to understand the difference does not show that the law is 
unconstitutionally vague or presents a substantial risk of arbitrary 
enforcement. If anything, Kelso shows that the risk or arbitrary enforcement 
is low-even in this limited circumstance-as the judiciary refused to permit 
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the charges to proceed absent the state's showing that the defendant had 
exceed the scope of her practice. 
Ironically, Plaintiffs' argument that light touch with movement should 
be excluded from licensing creates a greater potential for vagueness and 
arbitrary enforcement than the Rule Plaintiffs challenge. If light touching 
with movement were permitted without a license, enforcement would be 
focused on how much pressure was applied by a practitioner in a particular 
instance, which opens the door for much more discretion and arbitrary 
enforcement by DOPL or law enforcement. It would be difficult to draft a 
statute or rule that sufficiently informs practitioners of when light touching 
crosses the border into massage therapy territory. Under the current rule, 
those who perform systematic contact with movement of the soft tissue for 
the purposes outlined in the statue for a fee know they must have a license, 
and need not worry about the blurry line between "light touching with 
movement" and medium or deep massage. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the district court's 
decision. 
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